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United States workforce includes over eight million undocumented immigrants.2 
They work in the shadows to evade deportation, and they accept jobs and work-
ing conditions that their documented counterparts will not accept. As invisible as their day-
to-day work may be, undocumented workers are an integral, though unsanctioned, part of 
the u.s. economy. They build our houses, tend our crops, and slaughter our livestock. They help satiate the American 
craving for affordable abundance. At the same time, unauthorized immigrants are not supposed to be here, and their 
mere presence undermines our understanding of community and membership. Relied upon but unwelcome, among us 
but uninvited, undocumented workers labor on the border of inclusion and exclusion and are the subjects of a series of 
challenging questions: Should undocumented workers enjoy the same workplace protections that authorized workers 
enjoy? When and how much should immigration status matter? Does being here count for anything? Who belongs? 
Who is a member?
20 c l a r k  m e m o r a n d u m
disfigure society.”3 Indeed, “[w]e ought not to 
subjugate immigrants, not because we owe 
them anything, but to preserve our society as 
a community of equals.”4
MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION
A second possible rationale for territoriality 
is the mutuality of obligation rationale: the 
state owes individuals within the territory 
membership rights because those individu-
als are subject to the obligations imposed by 
the state. Under this rationale, territorial 
presence evidences the individual’s accep-
tance of the state’s jurisdiction over her. This 
concept flows from Westphalian notions 
of territorial sovereignty under which the 
nation-state is a unitary, self-contained actor 
with complete and exclusive jurisdiction over 
the people within its territory. Under such a 
system, no state may act within the boundar-
ies of another sovereign nation-state. Thus, a 
nation-state may only impose obligations on 
and protect the population within its territo-
rial borders. If a nation-state can only apply 
its rules within its territorial boundaries, then 
where an individual resides, rather than who 
the individual is, determines which rules apply. 
That is, presence within the nation-state’s ter-
ritory determines an individual’s obligations. 
The nation-state, in turn, affords those indi-
viduals whatever membership rights and ben-
efits it has undertaken to provide residents.
 The mutuality of obligation rationale 
for territoriality makes perfect sense in a 
purely Westphalian system. The reality, 
however, is that states often do impose obli-
gations outside their borders and selectively 
suspend obligations within their own ter-
ritory. Embassies, for example, function as 
islands of immunity from the obligations 
imposed by the host state within its terri-
tory even though embassies operate within 
the host state’s territory. States also routinely 
pass laws to govern the acts of their nation-
als abroad. This incongruous relationship 
between modern notions of jurisdiction 
have led some to call for the rejection of ter-
ritoriality and the adoption of a model based 
entirely on mutuality of obligation.
COMMUNITY TIES
Many have defended territoriality based on 
a community ties rationale. Under this view 
approach. Broadly speaking, the status-based 
approach distributes membership rights based 
on an individual’s legal status. Under such a 
conception of membership, undocumented 
immigrants have no formal, consensual rela-
tionship with the state and therefore are not 
members, while citizens enjoy the full suite 
of rights available. In contrast, territoriality 
distributes membership rights and benefits 
according to geographic boundaries without 
regard to legal status. Under a territorial 
approach, individuals within the state bound-
aries are members entitled to all rights offered 
by the state, while individuals outside the 
state boundaries have no guaranteed rights.
 Territoriality enjoys wide support in the 
academic community, no doubt because of 
its broad inclusiveness. However, skeptics 
have challenged territoriality’s theoretical 
underpinnings, and the challenge is not an 
easy one to meet. What is it about territorial 
presence that requires the distribution of full 
membership rights? Why reward territorial 
presence at all? Territoriality’s supporters offer 
three potential responses to these questions.
COMMUNITY PRESERVATION
One potential rationale for territoriality is the 
community preservation rationale. Under this 
rationale, equality of membership is impor-
tant, not because all individuals deserve mem-
bership rights equally, but because equality of 
membership preserves the nature of the com-
munity. This argument is not about fairness 
to strangers, but it is about preservation of a 
system, i.e., egalitarianism is worth preserv-
ing, not because newcomers to the territory 
deserve to be treated as equals, but because 
those who were already here desire to live in 
an egalitarian community and do not want to 
risk becoming a part of a future subclass of 
residents. Under this rationale, even an indi-
vidual’s consent to substandard treatment 
could not justify unequal treatment because 
the effect would be the same—the perpetua-
tion of a second-class caste.
 Community preservation explains vari-
ous scholars’ and courts’ espousal of territori-
ality. Owen Fiss, for example, has argued that 
the principle of self-preservation is implicit in 
the Fourteenth Amendment as “a statement 
about how society wishes to organize itself, 
and prohibits subjugation, even voluntary 
subjugation, because such a practice would 
 Unfortunately, the answers to these 
questions are less than clear. For much of 
u.s. history, undocumented workers have 
enjoyed many of the same rights that u.s. 
citizens have enjoyed by virtue of mere pres-
ence within u.s. territory. Recently, how-
ever, some undocumented workers have 
found that they cannot effectively enforce 
many of their statutorily protected employ-
ment rights, including the right to partici-
pate in union organizing activities, work 
in a discrimination-free environment, and 
be compensated for work-related injuries. 
Undocumented workers, it seems, are not 
considered full “members” of the employ-
ment protection franchise. Although this 
trend is not surprising given rising concern 
and anger over the large number of undocu-
mented immigrants filling u.s. jobs, the 
denial of membership rights to individuals 
based solely on unauthorized status is actu-
ally a significant deviation from the theory 
of membership developing in broader u.s. 
law. Outside of the employment sphere, 
courts are not looking to status to deter-
mine membership. Rather, they are increas-
ingly affording rights to individuals based 
on more fundamental indicators of mem-
bership including an individual’s ties to the 
surrounding community and subjection 
to u.s.-imposed obligations. Here, I argue 
that the distribution of employment-related 
rights should conform to this emerging, 
more nuanced approach, not merely for the 
sake of a consistently applicable membership 
theory but to avoid the draconian incentives 
produced by effectively denying undocu-
mented immigrants work-related rights.
 I. The Concept of Membership
The distribution of rights, regardless of 
type, boils down to a single question: Who 
belongs? This question follows naturally 
from the assumption that members—those 
who belong—deserve a certain type of 
treatment, and those who are not members 
deserve another. In that sense, the distribu-
tion of membership rights is as much about 
determining who does not belong as it is 
about determining who does belong.
 Two competing mechanisms or theories 
for sorting members from nonmembers have 
historically coexisted in the United States: 
the territorial approach and the status-based 
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 II. Territoriality’s Metamorphosis
Courts have begun to recognize territorial-
ity’s failure to always produce results consis-
tent with its underlying rationales. Territorial 
presence, it turns out, is an inadequate proxy 
for the more fundamental indicators of 
membership encompassed by territoriality’s 
underlying rationales. While a century ago 
u.s. courts held territorial presence to be an 
inviolable guarantee of many membership 
rights, strict territoriality has recently begun 
to wane. Instead of distributing rights based 
exclusively on an individual’s territorial pres-
ence, modern courts have begun to distribute 
rights to individuals only where consistent 
with the rationales of territoriality. Thus, ter-
ritoriality is undergoing a transformation; in 
this new conception of membership, which I 
call the “postterritorial” approach; courts are 
stem from a shared interest, familial ties, or 
professional obligations, rather than from 
physical proximity.
 Second, territoriality’s binary concep-
tion of members and nonmembers—in 
which those within the territory are full 
members and those outside the territory 
receive nothing—does not coincide with 
this affiliations-focused rationale. The types, 
depth, and number of community ties vary 
by individual. Community ties distribute 
across a spectrum, not on a binary toggle. 
Is there a threshold number and type of con-
nections required of a “member”? If com-
munity ties underlie territoriality, shouldn’t 
an individual with more connection to the 
surrounding community have a greater claim 
on membership rights than one whose only 
connection to the surrounding community 
is mere presence in it?
of territoriality, territorial presence serves as 
an indicator of an individual’s ties to other 
individuals and entities within the territorial 
boundaries of the state. This view of territo-
riality is attractive in its recognition of real 
human relationships as a basic social fabric, 
but the question remains: What is it about 
the existence of human relationships that 
requires the bestowal of membership rights?
 One answer is that an individual’s ties 
to the surrounding community foster com-
mitment and loyalty to the surrounding 
community. As an individual becomes 
dependent on her surrounding community, 
her personal interests align with those of 
the community. The individual is therefore 
more likely to make valuable contributions 
to the community and refrain from harming 
it in order to augment her own existence 
within the community. Affording member-
ship rights to such an individual rewards 
her contribution.
 Another answer is that as strangers 
develop ties to the surrounding commu-
nity, they begin to help define the char-
acter of the community. In other words, 
not only do the individual’s ties to the 
community merit the individual’s inclu-
sion as a member, but the community’s ties to 
the individual require inclusion of that indi-
vidual. By including such an individual, 
the state preserves the community’s char-
acter, which is a function of its members’ 
social affiliations. This argument is merely 
a restatement of what I have termed the 
community preservation rationale. That 
is, those who are members owe individu-
als who have formed ties to the community 
nothing. Rather, they owe it to the com-
munity—to themselves—to preserve those 
ties and the community built on those ties.
 Despite the appeal of the community 
ties rationale, it does not hold up well in 
practice. First, in today’s world, ties to other 
individuals and entities do not necessar-
ily depend on physical proximity. In fact, 
as the popularity of Internet-based social 
networking sites suggests, individuals may 
easily maintain affiliations with individu-
als in other countries. It is also entirely pos-
sible for an individual to have very few 
affiliations with those inside the country in 
which she resides. Moreover, even where 
an individual does have ties to others within 
the same nation-state, these affiliations may 
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cannot impose any obligations upon indi-
viduals abroad. Rather, the u.s.’s only obli-
gation was to Japan to conduct its consular 
affairs on mutually agreed terms.
 Reid v. Covert,18 decided more than 70 
years later, signaled a shift in the Supreme 
Court’s approach. There, the Court held 
that two u.s. citizens living abroad and con-
victed by a u.s. military court for the mur-
der of their husbands enjoyed the right to a 
trial by jury and indictment by a grand jury. 
Backtracking on its reasoning in Ross, the 
Court suggested that mutuality of obligation 
did require the u.s. to offer the defendants 
the requested membership rights. The Court 
reasoned that when the u.s. enforces obliga-
tions on citizens abroad, it must also offer 
corresponding protections: “[W]e reject the 
idea that when the United States acts against 
citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of 
Rights. . . . When the Government reaches 
out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the 
shield which the Bill of Rights and other 
parts of the Constitution provide to protect 
his life and liberty should not be stripped 
away just because he happens to be in 
another land.”19
 Reid rejected strict territoriality in favor 
of an approach based on mutuality of obli-
gation. While much of the Reid opinion 
focused on the defendants’ u.s. citizenship 
as the cornerstone of mutual obligation 
(and therefore suggested that a status-based 
approach to membership would govern), the 
Court’s recent opinion in Boumediene v. Bush20 
indicated that aliens, too, may enjoy some 
Constitutional protection outside of u.s. 
borders. In Boumediene, the Court squarely 
faced a question of membership—of which 
membership model to apply to determine 
whether enemy combatant detainees held 
at Guantanamo Bay were members for 
purposes of enjoying a right to the writ of 
habeas and the protections of the Suspension 
Clause. In its lengthy opinion, the Court 
struggled to define the contours of member-
ship, acknowledging that formal status and 
territorial presence within the u.s. were tra-
ditional indicators of membership.
 However, despite the detainees’ lack of 
status and territorial presence, the Court 
held that Congress could not deny them the 
privilege of habeas corpus without comply-
ing with the Suspension Clause. In reject-
ing a strictly territorial approach, the Court 
economically productive lives to the benefit 
of us all,”11 and “sustain[] our political and cul-
tural heritage. . . .”12
 Some of the first hints that territo-
rial presence would no longer categorically 
guarantee rights to aliens within u.s. ter-
ritory appeared just a few years after Plyler 
in Verdugo-Urquidez.13 There, the Supreme 
Court, in a plurality opinion, suggested 
that territorial presence may not be enough 
for some membership rights to attach. The 
Court’s opinion boldly recharacterized Yick 
Wo and its progeny: “These cases . . . estab-
lish only that aliens receive constitutional 
protections when they have come within the 
territory of the United States and developed 
substantial connections with this country.”14 The 
defendant in Verdugo, a Mexican national 
who had been brought to the United States 
against his will while u.s. law enforcement 
agents searched his house in Mexico without 
a warrant, had not established such connec-
tions: “[T]his sort of presence—lawful but 
involuntary—is not of the sort to indicate 
any substantial connection with our coun-
try.”15 The Court stopped short of requiring 
an individual to have significant community 
ties in the u.s. as a prerequisite to the enjoy-
ment of membership rights, but its language 
certainly suggested that affiliations might be 
indicative of membership within the u.s.
 Territoriality’s transformation is per-
haps most obvious in Supreme Court prec-
edent determining the rights of individuals 
outside u.s. borders. While strict territorial-
ity would categorically exclude such indi-
viduals from the distribution of membership 
rights, the Supreme Court has recently 
rejected strict territoriality in favor of a 
more functional, postterritorial approach. 
This is a significant departure from early 
precedent. In Ross,16 a seminal case that gov-
erned u.s. law for several decades, the Court 
denied that a sailor on a u.s. merchant ship 
had a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, 
even though he had been tried by a u.s. con-
sular court in Japan: “[t]he Constitution can 
have no operation in another country.”17 
Notably, the Court defended the territori-
ally based denial of constitutional rights 
based on the absence of mutual obligations 
between the petitioner and the u.s. govern-
ment. The Court suggested that a govern-
ment has no obligation to an individual 
outside its own territory because the state 
shedding their preoccupation with geogra-
phy and focusing on mutuality of obligation, 
community preservation, and community 
ties as the driving forces behind the distribu-
tion of membership rights.
 Territoriality’s metamorphosis has gained 
momentum only in the last several decades. 
In early u.s. history, being present in the 
United States categorically secured a great 
deal of membership rights for aliens within 
the United States, although the rationale for 
a territorial distribution of rights remained 
undeveloped for many years. In Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins,5 for example, the Supreme Court 
emphatically proclaimed, without explana-
tion, that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guar-
antees “are universal in their application, to 
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, 
without regard to any differences of race, of 
color, or of nationality.”6 In the years follow-
ing Yick Wo, the Court routinely held that 
immigrants, even those that were not law-
fully within u.s. territory, were entitled to 
membership rights by virtue of their presence 
within u.s. borders.7 However, the rationale 
for such a territorial conception of member-
ship remained vague.
 It was not until a century later, and per-
haps due to increasing concerns about the 
wisdom of offering constitutional rights to 
undocumented immigrants, that the Court 
offered a detailed defense of territorial-
ity’s guarantee of membership rights to all 
within the national territory. In Plyler v. Doe,8 
the Court invalidated a Texas statute that 
allowed local public schools to deny enroll-
ment to undocumented children. Those chil-
dren, the Court reasoned, were within the 
United States and therefore entitled to the 
equal protection of Texas law. In arriving at 
that conclusion, the Court offered a mutual-
ity of obligation rationale for territoriality. 
The Court reasoned that Texas was under an 
obligation to protect all those upon whom it 
could impose obligations—all individuals 
within Texas borders. As a second rationale 
for territoriality, the Court emphasized the 
need to preserve the national community’s 
character. The Court reasoned that educa-
tion “has a fundamental role in maintaining 
the fabric of our society.”9 According to the 
Court, we must afford unauthorized immi-
grants a public education in order to preserve 
“a democratic system of government,”10 
ensure that individuals will be able to “lead 
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employers who knowingly hire or continue to 
employ unauthorized workers.) Castro’s only 
remedy—and Hoffman’s only sanction—was 
an order to cease and desist from engaging in 
violations of the nlra and to post a notice of 
that order at Castro’s former work site.
 The Hoffman majority opinion highlights 
the duality of the undocumented worker’s 
position in the workplace. Undocumented 
workers labor on the border of the territorial 
and status-based models. By recognizing that 
undocumented workers present in the United 
States are “employees” covered under the 
nlra, the Supreme Court offered a measure 
of inclusion and membership to Castro and all 
undocumented workers. However, Castro’s 
membership ended there. Castro’s status as 
an undocumented immigrant foreclosed back 
pay because, under irca, Castro could not 
legally have worked at Hoffman during the 
period for which back pay was awarded.
 Hoffman has added a new dimension 
to both federal and state employment law 
litigation. Immigration status has now 
become a relevant factor in the distribu-
tion of various employment rights in many 
jurisdictions. In Escobar v. Spartan Security 
Service,23 for example, the court held that 
back pay was not available to a claimant 
who had been undocumented at the time 
of his employer’s alleged sexual harass-
ment, sexual discrimination, and retaliation 
even though the claimant had since gained 
authorization to work legally in the u.s. 
Similarly, a federal district court in Florida 
held that the estate of an undocumented 
employee injured in a forklift accident 
could not recover lost u.s. wages in its 
claim against the forklift manufacturer.24 
Citing Hoffman, the court reasoned that 
lost wage compensation was sufficiently 
like the back pay denied in Hoffman for 
the court to find that immigration status 
precluded its award to an undocumented 
worker: “Awarding lost wages is akin to 
compensating an employee for work to 
be performed. This Court cannot sanction 
such a result.”25 In what is likely the most 
expansive view of Hoffman, a Virginia court 
ordered a worker’s compensation claim- 
ant to respond to the employer’s discovery 
request regarding immigration status.26 
Citing Hoffman, the court held that the 
claimant’s immigration status was relevant, 
not merely to the remedies available, but to 
III. Territoriality’s Demise in the 
Employment Sphere: Where Work
 and Borders Collide
Given strict territoriality’s decline in u.s. 
law, it should come as no surprise that 
with respect to employment-related rights, 
immigrants can no longer solely rely on 
their territorial presence to secure pro- 
tections. However, territoriality’s decline 
in the employment sphere has not followed 
the same trajectory that territoriality has 
followed outside the employment sphere. 
In employment-related cases, courts are not 
focusing on the rationales underlying ter-
ritoriality to distribute membership rights. 
Rather, in this realm, territoriality is giving 
way to the status-based membership model 
rather than to the developing postterritorial 
model discussed above. For documented 
workers, this poses no obstacle to the enjoy-
ment of employment rights, as authorized 
status secures membership rights under the 
status-based model. Undocumented work-
ers, however, having no legal status under 
the law, have increasingly found themselves 
excluded from the effective enjoyment of 
many employment-related rights.
 It was the Supreme Court’s 2002 deci-
sion in Hoffman Plastics22 that solidified the 
status-based model’s encroachment into the 
employment sphere. There, the petitioner, 
Castro, had been unlawfully fired from his 
job because he was engaging in union orga-
nizing efforts, an activity protected under 
the National Labor Relations Act. Castro 
brought a claim for back pay (payment for 
work that would have been done if not for 
the unlawful termination of employment). 
However, during the resolution of his claim, 
Castro admitted he had no authorization to 
work in the United States and that he had 
secured employment at Hoffman with a 
fraudulent Social Security card. The Supreme 
Court acknowledged that Castro was pro-
tected under the National Labor Relations 
Act by virtue of his presence in the United 
States, but it refused to award Castro back 
pay. The Court reasoned that awarding back 
pay would run counter to the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act’s underlying policy 
of preventing the employment of undocu-
mented immigrants. (Passed in 1986, irca 
imposes civil and criminal penalties on 
observed that the u.s. was the sole entity 
imposing its laws at the naval station. No 
other government had effective jurisdiction 
over Guantanamo Bay. Thus, there was no 
reason the United States could not, in prac-
tice, afford constitutional protections to the 
detainees. In effect, the Court highlighted 
territoriality’s failure to preserve the notion 
of mutual obligations. The Court’s argu-
ment can, in part, be read as a critique of 
Westphalian notions of territoriality: since 
governments can and do impose obligations 
abroad, they also can and ought to afford 
corresponding protections: “Even when the 
United States acts outside its borders, its 
powers are . . . subject ‘to such restrictions as 
are expressed in the Constitution.’”21
 A bird’s-eye view of territoriality’s role 
in u.s. law suggests that strict territorial-
ity may not survive into the next century. 
This is not to say that territory no longer 
matters; it does. But territory no longer 
defines relationships in the way it once did, 
nor does territory pose the impenetrable 
barrier of sovereignty and exclusive juris-
diction idealized by Westphalian territorial 
preeminence. Territorial presence is thus 
no longer a consistently adequate proxy for 
fundamental indicators of membership. In 
territoriality’s stead, a more flexible post-
territorial membership approach is emerg-
ing in which membership is not based on 
the fiction that territorial presence signi-
fies membership in a society but on actu- 
al indicators of membership—community 
ties and mutuality of obligation—as well 
as an effort to preserve the character of the 
national community. Courts are looking to 
the rationales that historically justified ter-
ritoriality and evaluating membership with 
direct reference to those rationales. In that 
sense, territoriality is not dying; it is mak-
ing a transformation to keep up with the 
realities of modernity. Thus, courts are now 
asking and will likely increasingly be asking 
whether an individual (or class of individu-
als) (1) has significant and substantial ties 
to the surrounding community and (2) is 
subject to u.s. law in a way that triggers the 
u.s. government’s reciprocal obligations. 
However, even where an individual does 
not seem to evidence these two aspects of 
membership, courts will need to evaluate 
whether denying rights will threaten the 
character of u.s. society.
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fulfill its employment obligations. The rem-
edies approved by the majority in Hoffman, 
an order that the employer cease and desist 
its illegal conduct and post a notice to 
employees of the nlra violation, are a small 
price to pay for improper termination of an 
employee. With no remedy to enforce an 
ostensibly legally ensured right, employees 
will have little incentive to report their 
employers’ labor law violations, especially 
where employers threaten to expose an 
undocumented worker’s legal status during 
litigation. As a result, undocumented work-
ers will have little option but to continue 
working under substandard conditions.
 This, in turn, encourages the hiring of 
undocumented workers, a practice specifi-
cally prohibited by irca and ostensibly the 
very focus of irca. As the Hoffman dissenters 
recognized, the denial of back pay “lowers 
the cost to the employer of an initial labor law 
violation. . . . It thereby increases the employ-
er’s incentive to find and to hire illegal-alien 
employees” or at least encourages employers 
to hire “with a wink and a nod those poten-
tially unlawful aliens whose unlawful employ-
ment (given the Court’s views) ultimately will 
lower the costs of labor law violations.”28
 In addition, the reverse incentives cre-
ated by the failure to afford equal remedies to 
undocumented immigrants erode workplace 
standards for all employees, especially where 
undocumented workers compose a high 
percentage of the workforce. Where undoc-
umented workers are readily available and 
easily coerced into remaining quiet about 
labor law violations, documented workers, 
too, will be reluctant to report those viola-
tions out of a fear of being replaced by an 
undocumented worker or as a result of pres-
sure from undocumented coworkers who 
do not want to risk exposure of immigra-
tion status. Statistics suggest this dynamic 
may indeed be present: industries in which 
undocumented workers compose a high per-
centage of employees (which are often the 
most dangerous and lowest paying indus-
tries) exhibit a high incidence of wage and 
hour law violations.
 In addition to the troubling incentives cre-
ated by the use of a status-based approach to 
deny employment-related rights and benefits 
to undocumented workers, the status-based 
approach is inconsistent with the emerg-
ing postterritorial approach to membership 
the claimant’s qualification to bring suit at 
all: “Essentially, Plaintiff ’s argument that he 
is entitled to make a workers’ compensation 
claim, even if he is an illegal alien, is ‘fore-
closed by federal immigration policy. . . .’”27
 The fractured view of membership 
widely applied to the distribution of employ-
ment rights and benefits creates significant 
concerns on many levels. Perhaps most dis-
turbing, the Hoffman approach to undocu-
mented workers undermines federal immi- 
gration policy, the very issue with which the 
majority claimed to be concerned. As many 
have argued, the exclusion of unauthorized 
immigrants from labor protections is likely to 
create incentives for employers to continue 
hiring unauthorized workers. First, removing 
back pay as an available remedy for the viola-
tion of any employee’s employment rights 
severely diminishes an employer’s incentive to 
Undocumented 
workers 
contribute to 
a collective 
effort and add 
value to an 
enterprise. 
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ship may help illuminate the difficult path 
that lies ahead as the United States engages in 
immigration reform and makes difficult deci-
sions about who belongs and what belonging 
here means.
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an employee—it allows employers to govern 
employees without legal constraint.
 Third, and perhaps most important, the 
failure to enforce the rights of the undocu-
mented worker is likely to create a subcaste 
of workers without enforceable rights. Aside 
from leaving a group of residents without 
full legal recourse for blatant violations 
of employment rights, this threatens our 
societal norms of equal rights in the work-
place and ultimately endangers the rights 
of authorized workers and citizens. Absent 
full protection for undocumented workers, 
employment standards could be weighed 
down by the sheer number of undocumented 
immigrants working under subpar condi-
tions. A bifurcated system of employment 
protections in which one group enjoys more 
remedies than the other cannot be sustained 
for long; such a system brings to mind 
Thomas Jefferson’s warning against the pas-
sage of the Alien and Sedition Acts: “The 
friendless alien has indeed been selected as 
the safest subject of a first experiment; but 
the citizen will soon follow. . . .”29
IV. Conclusion
The increasing presence of undocumented 
workers in the u.s. labor force poses challeng-
ing questions for courts and elected officials 
about the meaning of immigration status, 
presence in the United States, and, as I have 
argued here, the broader concept of member-
ship. I do not claim to have all the answers 
to these questions. Rather, my hope is that 
I have given a larger context to questions 
surrounding undocumented workers, and 
more broadly, undocumented immigrants. 
Membership rights can be distributed many 
different ways. It is important that the u.s. 
choice of a membership approach be a delib-
erate, conscientious choice that furthers our 
overall policies and goals rather than the 
result of a hasty reaction to surging unauthor-
ized immigration. In the employment sphere, 
I believe u.s. law has diverged from a broader 
u.s. commitment to and trend toward a more 
principled approach to membership. But it is 
not too late to correct the course of employ-
ment rights distribution. Indeed, commenta-
tors from both ends of the political spectrum 
are calling for an overhaul of our immigration 
policy. My hope is that analyzing the undocu-
mented worker through the lens of member-
emerging outside of the employment sphere. 
Territoriality’s trajectory in the employment 
sphere represents a stray branch in the overall 
trajectory of membership theory within u.s. 
law. While outside the employment sphere 
territoriality is undergoing a transformation 
into a more principled, nuanced membership 
approach, territoriality as it has historically 
applied in the employment sphere is giving 
way to an even more formalistic approach. To 
avoid the undesirable incentives created by the 
use of a status-based model in the employment 
sphere and to bring the distribution of mem-
bership rights within the employment sphere 
in line with territoriality’s broader transforma-
tion, courts must begin to employ the emerg-
ing postterritorial approach to distribute 
employment-related rights.
 Under the developing postterritorial 
approach to membership, undocumented 
workers, as a category, are members of the 
employment sphere entitled to the full dis-
tribution of membership rights available in 
that sphere. First, undocumented workers 
have significant affiliations with their sur-
rounding community. Their employment, 
alone, ensures the existence of these ties. 
Undocumented workers contribute to a col-
lective effort and add value to an enterprise. 
Their employers and the broader economy rely 
on undocumented workers to perform what 
are often undesirable and dangerous tasks that 
few authorized workers care to perform.
 Second, the principle of mutuality of 
obligation further suggests that undocu-
mented workers, despite their lack of 
work authorization, are members entitled 
to full membership rights. On one level, 
and as articulated in Boumediene, the only 
law that applies to undocumented work-
ers in the United States is u.s. law, and the 
government must not impose obligations 
upon undocumented immigrants without 
also affording corresponding protections. 
But on a more specific level, the relation-
ship between employee and employer is 
one of reciprocal obligations. An employee 
subjects herself to the requirements and 
instructions of an employer on the express 
assumption that the employee will abide 
by legally imposed standards. To allow an 
employer to circumvent these standards by 
denying undocumented immigrants certain 
remedies is to approve of the employer’s 
refusal to fulfill its reciprocal obligations to 
